In a homomorphic signature scheme, a user Alice signs some large dataset x using her secret signing key and uploads the signed data to an untrusted remote server. The server can then run some computation y = f (x) over the signed data and homomorphically derive a short signature σ f,y certifying that y is the correct output of the computation f . Anybody can verify the tuple (f, y, σ f,y ) using Alice's public verification key and become convinced of this fact without having to retrieve the entire underlying data.
Introduction
Motivated by the prevalence of cloud computing, there has been much interest in cryptographic schemes that allow a user Alice to securely outsource her data to an untrusted remote server (e.g., the cloud), while also allowing the server to perform useful computations over this data. The ground-breaking development of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) by Gentry [27] allows Alice to maintain the privacy of her data by encrypting it, while allowing the server to homomorphically perform arbitrary computations over the ciphertexts. In this work, we are interested in the dual question of authenticity.
Homomorphic Signatures. A homomorphic signature scheme allows Alice to sign some large dataset x using her secret signing key. She can then distribute the signed data to some untrusted entity called a "data processor". A data processor can perform arbitrary computations y = f (x) over this data and homomorphically derive a signature σ f,y , which certifies that y is the correct output of the computation f over Alice's data. The derived signature σ f,y should be short, with length independent of the size of the data x. Anybody can ver-ify the tuple (f, y, σ f,y ) using Alice's public verification key and become convinced that y is indeed the correct output of the computation f over Alice's signed data x, without needing to download the entire data x. Although the computational effort of verifying a derived signature is proportional to the complexity of computing the function f , this work can be performed offline prior to seeing the signature, and can be amortized when verifying the same computation over many datasets.
Application: Computation on Outsourced Data. As the most basic application of homomorphic signatures, a user Alice can outsource her signed data to a remote server acting as a data processor, and later verify various computations performed by the server over her data. Using homomorphic signatures, this can be done with minimal communication and interaction consisting of a single short signature sent from the server to Alice. Although verifying the correctness of this computation takes Alice as much time as the computation itself, she avoids having to store this data long term. We refer the reader to Section 1.2 for a detailed comparison with related work on delegating memory and computation.
Application: Certified Data Analysis. The noninteractive nature of homomorphic signatures and the fact that they provide public verifiability also makes them useful in a wide variety of settings beyond the above outsourcing scenario.
For example, consider a scenario where a trusted agency such as the National Institute of Health (NIH), runs a large-scale medical study. It signs the collected data x and distributes it to various research groups and pharmaceutical companies for analysis. Some of these groups may have incentives to lie about the outcomes of their analysis and are not trusted by the public. However, using homomorphic signatures, they can publicly post their methodology for the analysis (a function f ), the claimed outcome of the analysis (y = f (x)), and a short signature σ f,y that certifies the correctness of the outcome. This information can be posted publicly (e.g., on third-party websites) and verified by the public using a verification key published by the NIH. The public does not need to have access to the underlying data and does not need to interact with the NIH or the research groups that performed the computation to verify such signatures -indeed, these entities may go offline and the underlying data may be deleted after the analysis is performed but the signed results remain verifiable. Furthermore, such signatures can be made context hiding to ensure that they do not reveal anything about the underlying medical data beyond the outcome of the analysis. In this case, the NIH trusts the research groups to preserve the privacy of the underlying data (from the world), but the world does not trust the research groups to perform the analysis correctly.
Our Results
In this work, we construct the first (leveled) fully homomorphic signature schemes that can evaluate arbitrary circuits over signed data, where only the maximal depth d of the circuit needs to be fixed a priori. The size of the evaluated signature grows polynomially in d, but is otherwise independent of the data size or the circuit size. This is an exponential improvement in capabilities over the best prior homomorphic signature schemes which could only evaluate polynomials of some bounded degree k where the efficiency degraded polynomially with
Our solutions are based on the hardness of the small integer solution (SIS) problem (with subexponential parameters) in standard lattices, which is in turn implied by the worst-case hardness of standard lattice problems [3] . This is also a significant improvement in assumptions over the best prior schemes which either relied on ideal lattices or multi-linear maps.
We get a scheme in the standard model, where the maximal dataset size needs to be bounded by some polynomial N during setup and the size of the public parameters is linear in N . In the random-oracle model, we get rid of this caveat and get a scheme with short public parameters and without any a-priori bound on the dataset size. In both cases, the user can sign arbitrarily many different datasets by associating each dataset with some label (e.g., a file name). The verifier must know the label of the dataset on which the computation was supposed to be performed when verifying the output.
Efficient Online/Amortized Verification. Our schemes allow for fast amortized verification of a computation f over many different datasets, even if the datasets belong to different users with different verification keys. In particular, the verifier only needs to perform work proportional to the circuit size of f once to verify arbitrarily many signatures under arbitrary verification keys. This work can be performed offline prior to receiving any of the signatures, and the online verification can then be much more efficient than computing f .
Context Hiding. Our schemes can also be made context hiding so that a signature σ f,y does not reveal any additional information about the underlying data x beyond the output y = f (x). We show how to achieve this statistically without relying on any additional assumptions.
Composition. Our schemes also allow composition of several different computations over signed data. One evaluator can compute some functions
over signed data x and publish the homomorphically computed signatures σ h 1 ,y 1 , . . . , σ h ,y . A second evaluator can then come and perform an additional computation y * = g(y1, . . . , y ) on the outputs of the previous computation and combine the signatures σ h 1 ,y 1 , . . . , σ h ,y into σ g•h,y * which certifies y * as the output of the com-
. . , h (x)). The second evaluator does not need to know the original data x or the original signatures. This can continue as long as the total computation is of bounded depth.
Related Work
Linearly Homomorphic Schemes. Many prior works consider the question of homomorphic message authentication codes (MACs with private verification) and signatures (public verification) for restricted homomorphisms, and almost exclusively for linear functions: [1, 5-7, 15-17, 21, 25, 26, 33, 44] . Such MACs and signautres have interesting applications to network coding and proofs of retrievability.
Homomorphic Signatures Beyond Linear. Boneh and Freeman [15] were the first to consider homomorphic signatures beyond linear functions, and propose a general definition of such signatures. They present a scheme that can evaluate arbitrary polynomials over signed data, where the maximal degree k of the polynomial is fixed a priori and the size of the evaluated signature grows (polynomially) in k. If we want to translate this to the setting of circuits, then a circuit of depth d can be represented by a polynomial of degree as high as k = 2 d , and therefore the signature size can grow exponentially in the depth of the circuit. The construction is based on the hardness of the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem in ideal lattices and has a proof of security in the random-oracle model. The recent work of Catalano et al. [22] gives an alternate solution using multi-linear maps which removes the need for random oracles at the cost of having large public parameters. The main open question left by these works is to construct signatures with greater levels of homomorphism, and ideally a fully homomorphic scheme that can evaluate arbitrary circuits.
Homomorphic MACs Beyond Linear. There has also been progress in constructing homomorphic message authentication (MACs) with private verification for larger classes of homomorphisms. The work of Gennaro and Wichs [34] defines and achieves fully homomorphic MACs using fully homomorphic encryption. However, the security of the scheme only holds in a setting without verification queries and can completely break down if the attacker has access to a verification oracle allowing him to test whether authentication tags are valid. More recent works [8, 19, 20] show how to get homomorphic MACs that remain secure in the presence of verification queries, but only for restricted homomorphisms. Currently, the best such schemes allow for the evaluation of polynomials of degree k, where the computational effort grows polynomially with k (but the size of the evaluated authentication tag stays fixed). In other words, the question of (leveled) fully homomorphic authentication, even in the setting of private verification, remained open prior to this work.
Other Types of Homomorphic Authentication. We also mention works on specific types of homomorphic properties such as redactable and transitive signatures and (see e.g., [2, 36, 40] ) where, given a signature on a long message x, it should be possible to derive a signature on a subset/substring x of x. The work of [2] proposes a general notion of P -homomorphic signature schemes for various predicates P , but efficient constructions were only known for a few specific instances.
Homomorphic Signatures via SNARKs. There is a very simple construction of fully homomorphic signatures by relying on CS-Proofs [39] or, more generally, succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge for NP (SNARKs) [10-12, 14, 32, 41] . This primitive allows us to non-interactively create a short "argument" π for any NP statement so that π proves "knowledge" of the corresponding witness. The length of π is bounded by some fixed polynomial in the security parameter and is independent of the statement/witness size. The complexity of verifying π only depends on the size of the statement (but not the witness). Using SNARKs, we can authenticate the output y = f (x) of any computation f over any signed data x (under any standard signature scheme) by creating a short argument π f,y that proves the knowledge of "data x along with valid signature of x, such that f (x) = y".
One advantage of the SNARK-based scheme is that a signature can be verified very efficiently, independently of the complexity of the computation f being verified, as long as f has a short Turing-Machine description. In contrast, in this work, we will only get efficient verification in an amortized sense, when verifying a computation f over many different datasets. Unfortunately, constructing SNARKs, even without a "knowledge" requirement, is known to require the use of non-standard assumptions [30] . The additional requirement of (non black-box) knowledge extraction makes SNARKs even more problematic and is unlikely to be possible in its full generality [13] . Known SNARK constructions are either based on the random-oracle heuristic and the use of PCP machinery, or on various "knowledge of exponent" assumptions and light-weight PCP variants.
Delegating Computation. Several other works consider the related problem of delegating computation to a remote server while maintaining the ability to efficiently verify the result [4, 9, 23, 24, 31, 35, 37, 42, 43] . In this scenario, the server needs to convince the user that f (x) = y, where the user knows the function f , the input x and the output y, but does not want to do the work of computing f (x). In contrast, in our scenario the verifier only knows f and y but does not know the previously authenticated data x, which may be huge. As mentioned in [34] , some of the results for delegating computation in the pre-processing model can also be reinterpreted as giving results for the latter scenario. The latter scenario was also explicitly considered by Chung et al. [23] in the context of memory delegation, where the client can also update the data on the server. Some of these solutions only allow a single party with secret key to verify computation, while others (e.g., [42] ) allow anyone to verify. However, all of the above solutions for memory delegation and delegating computation require at least some interaction between the client and server (often just a challenge-response protocol) to verify a computation f . Therefore they do not give us a solution to the problem of homomorphic signatures (or even homomorphic MACs), where we require a static certificate which certifies the output of a computation and which can be posted publicly and verified by everyone.
Reader's Guide. In Section 2, we give a brief definition of (fully) homomorphic signatures, followed by an informal overview of our results and techniques in Section 3. In the full version we provide detailed definitions, constructions and proofs of security for the interested reader.
Homomorphic Signatures: Definition
We begin by giving a simplified definition of homomorphic signatures that can only sign a single data set. We will eventually show how to generically "upgrade" such signatures to sign multiple datasets. We also require that the data set is of some bounded size N determined at setup. We will show how to remove these restrictions in the random oracle model or under a non-standard but falsifiable assumption on hash functions. A single-data homomorphic signature scheme consists of poly-time algorithms (PrmsGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Process, SignEval) with the following syntax.
• prms ← PrmsGen(1 λ , 1 N ): Gets the security parameter λ and a data-size bound N . Generates public parameters prms. The security parameter also defines the message space X .
• (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 λ , prms): Gets the security parameter λ. Generates a verification/secret keys pk, sk.
• (σ1, . . . , σN ) ← Sign sk (x1, . . . , xN ): Signs some data (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X N .
• σ * = SignEval prms (g, ((x1, σ1) , . . . , (xN , σN ))): Homomorphically computes a signature σ * .
• Verify pk (g, y, σ): Verifies that y is indeed the output of g by checking the signature σ.
Correctness. We require that for any prms ∈ PrmsGen(1 λ , 1 N ), (pk, sk) ∈ KeyGen(1 λ , prms), (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X N and (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ Sign sk (x1, . . . , xN ) and g : X N → X , we have:
where σ * = SignEval prms (g, ((x1, σ1) , . . . , (xN , σN ) ). In the full definition, we have a more complex definition of correctness for "composed evaluation", allowing us to keep computing on signatures derived from previous computations. Also, if the function g only "touches" a small subset of locations i ∈ [N ] of the data then so does the evaluation procedure.
In a leveled fully homomorphic scheme, we relax the above correctness requirement. Each signature σi will have some associated "noise-level" βi. The initial signatures produced by (σ1, . . . , σN ) ← Sign sk (x1, . . . , xN ) will have a "small" noise-level βinit. The noise-level β * of the homomorphically computed signature σ * := SignEval prms (g, ((x1, σ1) , . . . , (x , σ ))) depends on the noiselevels βi of the signatures σi, and the function g. If the noise level β * of σ * exceeds some threshold β * > βmax, then the above correctness requirements need not hold. This will limit the type of functions that can be evaluated. A function g is admissible if, whenever the signatures σi have noise-levels βi ≤ βinit, then σ * will have noise-level β * ≤ βmax.
Security Game. We define the security of homomorphic signatures via the following game between an attacker A and a challenger:
• The challenger samples prms ← PrmsGen(1 λ , 1 N ) and (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 λ , prms) and gives prms, pk to the adversary.
• The attacker A(1 λ ) chooses data (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X * and sends it to the challenger.
• The challenger computes
and gives the signatures (σ1, . . . , σN ) to A.
• The attacker A chooses an admissible function g : X N → X and values y , σ . Let y := g(x1, . . . , xN ). The attacker wins if all of the following hold: (1) g is admissible on the values x1, . . . , xN , (2) y = y, and (3) Verify pk (g, y , σ ) = accept.
We say a homomorphic signature scheme is fully secure if for all PPT A, we have Pr[A wins ] ≤ negl(λ) in the above game. We will also consider a selective security game for single-data homomorphic signatures, where the attacker chooses the data x1, . . . , xN to be signed before seeing prms and pk.
Efficiency. The main efficiency requirement is that size of the homomorphically derived signatures σ * = SignEval prms (g, ((x1, σ1) , . . . , (xN , σN )))
should be short, bounded by some fixed polynomial p(λ, d) depending on the security parameter and (in a leveled scheme) the maximal depth d of the circuits being evaluated, but independent of the data size N or the circuit size of g. Although the efficiency of the verification procedure Verify pk (g, y, σ) can depend on the circuit size of g, we can decompose the procedure into an offline component αg ← Processprms(g) which computes a short "digest" of the function g and an efficient online component Verify pk (αg, y, σ) that works on the digest and whose running time is bounded by some fixed polynomial p(λ, d), but independent of the data size N or the circuit size of g.
Lastly, in some of our schemes, we will allow the size of the public parameters prms (but not the public key pk) to depend on the data-size N . If this is the case, we say that the scheme has large public parameters.
Constructions of Homomorphic Signatures
Our constructions of homomorphic signatures are modular and build on top of a new primitive of potentially independent interest that we call a homomorphic trapdoor function (HTDF). In addition to being a building block for homomorphic signatures, this primitive allows us to conceptually unify homomorphic encryption and signatures.
In this section, we given an informal, yet hopefully informative, overview of our constructions. We start by defining the notion of HTDFs, then show how to construct homomorphic signatures from HTDFs, and finally show how to construct HTDFs from the hardness of the short integer solutions (SIS) problem [3, 28] .
Homomorphic Trapdoor Functions (HTDF)
An HTDF consists of a function v = f pk,x (u) described via a public key pk and an index x ∈ {0, 1}, with input u and output v. It will be useful to think of this as a commitment scheme where x is the message, v is the commitment and u is the randomness/decommitment. Given some values (u1, x1, v1), . . . , (uN , xN , vN ) where vi = f pk,x i (ui), and a circuit g : {0, 1} N → {0, 1}, we can homomorphically compute 
Thinking of HTDFs as commitments, the above says that if the values vi are commitments to the message bits xi with decommitments ui, then we can homomorphically combine the vi to derive a commitment v * and homomorphically combine the messages/decommitments (xi, ui) to get a decommitment u * which opens v * to the message g(x1, . . . , xN ).
We want to be able to generate the public key pk of the HTDF together with a trapdoor sk that allows us to take any output v and efficiently invert it with respect to any index x to get u ← Inv sk,x (v) such that f pk,x (u) = v. We furthermore require that Inv is not just an inverter, but a pre-image sampler [28] in the sense that the following two distributions are statistically close for any x:
Here, on the left hand side, u is a uniformly random element in the domain of the function f pk,x and v = f pk,x (u), whereas on the right hand side, v is a uniformly random element in the range and u is an inverse sampled by the algorithm Inv. In the language of commitments, this means that we want the scheme to be equivocable (and therefore statistically hiding) with a trapdoor sk that lets us open any commitment to any message.
For security, we simply require that the HTDF is clawfree: given pk, it should be hard to come up with inputs u0, u1 such that f pk,0 (u0) = f pk,1 (u1). Equivalently, in the language of commitments, we want the scheme to be computationally binding.
The Duality Between Encryption and Signatures.
As an intellectual curiosity, we observe that one could also change our requirements and instead ask for an HTDF which is extractable (and therefore statistically binding) while also being computationally hiding. In other words, we would want to generate pk along with a trapdoor sk that would allow us to extract x from v = f pk,x (u). In this case, such an HTDF could also be thought of as a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, where v is the ciphertext of a message x and HTDF.Eval out is the homomorphic evaluation procedure on ciphertexts.
Our eventual construction of an HTDF will provide both options by allowing us to choose pk in one of two indistinguishable modes: an equivocable mode and an extractable mode. In this work, we will solely rely on the equivocable mode to construct homomorphic signatures. However, the extractable mode of the HTDF (essentially) corresponds to the Gentry-Sahai-Waters [29] fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Therefore, we view HTDFs as providing an interesting conceptual unification of homomorphic signatures and encryption. We refer the reader to the full version of the paper on this grand unification.
Basic Homomorphic Signatures from HTDFs
We construct several flavors of homomorphic signature schemes using HTDFs as a black-box. As the most basic flavor, we construct a signature scheme in the standard model with large public parameters -the setup procedure knows some bound N on the size of the dataset that will be signed and the size of the public parameters can depend on N . Moreover, the basic scheme can only sign a single dataset and only achieves selective security, meaning that the dataset must be chosen independently of the public parameters. In the next section, we will show general theorems that upgrade this to a many dataset, fully secure scheme, under no additional assumptions. Furthermore, we will also achieve short public parameters in the Random Oracle model or under a non-standard but falsifiable assumption on hash functions. Let us first focus on the basic scheme in this section.
The global public parameters prms = (v1, . . . , vN ) consist of N random outputs of the HTDF (equivalently, N random elements in the range of the HTDF family). Each user chooses a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) for an HTDF, which also serves as the key pair for the signature scheme. To sign some data x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ {0, 1} N the user simply finds inputs ui such that f pk,x i (ui) = vi by using sk to invert vi. We think of ui as a signature that ties xi to its position i. The signature of the data is the tuple (u1, . . . , uN ) . Given x, the signatures u1, . . . , uN , and a function g : {0, 1} N → {0, 1}, anybody can homomorphically compute a signature u * g,y := HTDF.Eval in (g, (x1, u1) , . . . , (xN , uN ) ) which certifies y = g(x1, . . . , xN ) as the output of the computation g. To verify the tuple (g, y, u * g,y ), the verifier will compute v * := HTDF.Eval out (g, v1, . . . , vN ) and checks f pk,y (u * g,y )
? = v * . Notice that the verification procedure only depends on the public parameters but does not know the data x.
We can show that this basic scheme already satisfies selective security, namely where we assume that dataset x1, . . . , xN is chosen by the attacker before seeing the public parameters. In the reduction, instead of choosing vi randomly, we choose a random input ui and compute vi := f pk,x i (ui) using the data xi that the attacker wants signed. This makes it easy for the reduction to generate signatures for xi. Furthermore, for any function g, the reduction can compute the honest signature u = HTDF.Eval in (g, (x1, u1), . . . , (xN , uN ) ) which certifies the output y = g(x1, . . . , xN ). If an attacker produces a forged signature u that certifies y = y then f pk,y (u) = f pk,y (u ) and therefore (u, u ) breaks the claw-free security of the HTDF.
Upgrading Functionality and Security
We show how to generically start with a basic (single dataset, selectively secure) homomorphic signature scheme as above and convert it into more powerful variants of homomorphic signatures with improved security, functionality and efficiency.
Better Security: From Selective to Full (Adaptive) Security. We give a generic transformation from a homomorphic signature scheme with selective security to a scheme with full adaptive security, wherein the adversary can choose the challenge dataset depending on the public parameters. Starting from a selectively secure leveled fully homomorphic signature scheme, we obtain a fully secure leveled scheme.
1 Our transformation works in both the standard model and the random oracle model.
On a high level, the transformation is similar to the use of chameleon hashing to go from security against selective chosen-message security (e.g., the signing queries are all made ahead of time) to adaptive chosen-message security [38] . However, to make this work with homomorphic signatures, we need the chameleon hash to also be homomorphic. Fortunately, HTDFs can be thought of as providing exactly such primitive. In fact, we show the following general theorem: Theorem 3.1 (Informal). Assume the existence of (leveled) fully homomorphic trapdoor functions. There is a compiler that converts any selectively secure (leveled) fully homomorphic signature scheme into a fully secure (leveled) fully homomorphic signature scheme.
We refer the reader to the full version for the transformation details. 1 Although Catalano et al. [22] provide a similar transformation, it works only for bounded degree polynomial functions, and does not generalize to (leveled) fully homomorphic schemes.
Better Functionality: From Single Data to Multi Data. Following Boneh and Freeman [15] , we can extend the functionality of homomorphic signatures to allow the user to sign multiple different datasets under different labels τ (e.g., τ can correspond to a "file name"), where the verifier must simply know the label of the dataset on which the computation was supposed to be performed. We show a generic transformation from a basic signature that only works for a single dataset into one that supports multiple datasets. The main idea is to simply pick a fresh a verification/signing key of a singledata homomorphic signature scheme for each dataset and to sign the verification key together with the label of the dataset using a standard (non-homomorphic) signature scheme. Furthermore, this transformation gives us efficient amortized verification of a computation over multiple datasets.
Theorem 3.2 (Informal).
There is a compiler that converts any single data (leveled) fully homomorphic signature scheme into a multi data (leveled) fully homomorphic signature scheme.
We refer the reader to the full version for the definition of a multi-data fully homomorphic signature scheme and the construction of this compiler.
Short Public Parameters. Finally, we note that since the public parameters prms = (v1, . . . , vN ) of our basic scheme are uniformly random values, we can easily compress them in the random oracle model to get a scheme with short public parameters. In particular, the public parameters of the new scheme only consist of a short random string r and we can derive the values vi = H(r, i) using a random oracle H. This gives us a tradeoff between efficiency and assumptions. We note that our use of the random oracle is mild, in the sense that we can prove security under a falsifiable and standard-model (albeit non-standard) assumption on the hash function H. An interesting open problem is to construct a scheme with short public parameters (independent of the data size N ) in the standard model, under standard assumptions such as SIS.
Constructing HTDFs
We now briefly describe how to construct HTDFs based on the SIS problem. We rely on the homomorphic techniques developed by Gentry, Sahai and Waters [29] and by Boneh et al. [18] in the context of fully homomorphic encryption and attribute-based encryption.
The SIS problem states that, for a random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q it should be hard to come up with a "short" non-zero vector u ∈ Z m q , such that A · u = 0. However, there is a way to generate A along with a trapdoor td that makes this easy and, more generally, for any matrix V ∈ Z n×m q , the trapdoor can be used to sample a "short" matrix U ∈ Z m×m q such that AU = V. There is also a public matrix G ∈ Z n×m q with some special structure (not random) for which everyone can efficiently compute a "short" matrix
(Note that we are abusing notation and G −1 is not a matrix but rather a function
For any V there are many choices of U such that GU = V, and G −1 (V) deterministically outputs a particular short matrix from this set. For those familiar with [29] , multiplication by G corresponds to PowersOf2() and G −1 () corresponds to BitDecomp()).
Our HTDF consists of choosing pk = A together with trapdoor sk = td as above. We define f pk,x (U) def = AU + x · G, but we restrict the domain to "short" matrices U. We show that finding a claw consisting of "short" matrices U0, U1 such that f pk,0 (U0) = f pk,1 (U1) implies that A(U0 −U1) = G which in turn implies breaking the SIS problem. Next, we show how to perform homomorphic operations on this HTDF.
Homomorphic Operations. Let U1, U2 ∈ Z m×m q be "short" matrices and
Firstly, it is very easy to perform homomorphic addition (over Zq). We can simply set: V * = V1 + V2 and U * = U1 + U2. This ensures:
Multiplication. Homomorphic multiplication (over Zq) consists of setting V * := V2G −1 (V1) and U * := x2U1+ U2G −1 (V1). This gives:
We define the noise level of a matrix U to be the maximal size (in absolute value) of any entry in the matrix. The noise level grows as we perform homomorphic operations. Intuitively, if the inputs to the operation have noise-level β then homomorphic addition just doubles the noise level to 2β, while multiplication of "small" values x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1} multiplies the noise level to at most (m + 1)β. Therefore, when evaluating a boolean circuit of depth d the noise level can grow to as much as β(m + 1) d . We pause to note that the noise growth is a crucial difference between our scheme and that of Boneh and Freeman [15] , where multiplication raises the noise level from β to β 2 , meaning that evaluating a circuit of depth d could raise the noise level to as high as β We refer the reader to the full version for the formal definition and construction of an HTDF family.
Conclusions. In this work, we construct the first leveled fully homomorphic signature schemes. It remains an open problem to get rid of the leveled aspect and ideally come up with a signature scheme where there is no a priori bound on the depth of the circuits that can be evaluated and the signature size stays fixed. It also remains an open problem to come up with a (leveled) fully homomorphic signature scheme with short public parameters under a standard assumption without random oracles.
Details in the full version. In the full version, we first formally define the notion of homomorphic trapdoor functions which is the main technical tool of the paper. We then show how to construct HTDFs based on the SIS problem.
Then, we provide details on how to construct singledata selectively secure FHS schemes in the standard model, albeit with large public parameters whose size exceeds the maximal size of the dataset to be signed. The public parameters are just uniformly random and therefore, in the random oracle model, we can easily compress them to get a scheme with short public parameters. Also in the full version, we also explore the idea of short public parameters further and show that such schemes can be proven secure in the standard model under a simple-to-state and falsifiable (but non-standard) assumptions on hash functions. Finally, we then show a generic transformation that combines a homomorphic signature scheme with selective security and an HTDF to get a homomorphic signature scheme with full security.
Following it, we define multi-data signatures where the signer can sign many different datasets under different labels. We give a generic transformation from single-data homomorphic signatures to multi-data ones. (We also give an alternate transformation which yields a simpler construction of a multi-data scheme with full security in the RO model.)
Lastly, we show how to make the signature schemes context hiding to ensure that a derived signature does not reveal anything about the underlying data beyond the output of the function being certified. Although this can be done generically using NIZKs, we show a simple way to add this feature to our specific construction without additional assumptions. The context-hiding property holds statistically.
